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Over the past several months, the international debate over whether or not to forcibly disarm Saddam 
Hussein by invading Iraq has generated much speculation about how the future of the Persian Gulf will be 
shaped after his removal from power. Most concern has been focused on the government to be created in 
Iraq, and at least temporary military occupation by the United States and its coalition partners, the 
potential role of the United Nations allied powers, and how long it will take to reconstitute a viable Iraqi 
state. 
Often overlooked in the analysis is the impact that Saddam's removal will have on the configuration of 
U.S. military forces in the Gulf that have been enforcing the United Nations sanctions regime on Iraq 
since the end of Gulf War I. The presence of these forces has entailed a major commitment of resources 
for all the military departments, which would probably welcome a reduction in these commitments. Much 
of the burden of this enforcement mission has fallen to the United States Navy, and Saddam's removal 
will have a big impact on its operations in the theater.  
USN Forces in the Gulf 
When compared to the force levels operating in the Gulf prior to 1991, the U.S. Navy's presence over the 
past 13 years has doubled to approximately 30 vessels and a continuously deployed carrier battle group, 
and operations over the past two months have seen the tripling of operational tempo in the Persian Gulf 
and surrounding seaways. As of 31 March 2003, naval air and ship support to Operation Iraqi Freedom 
included: six carrier battle groups (totaling over 50 ships, 400 aircraft, and approximately 50,000 
personnel), including two amphibious task groups and three amphibious ready groups.[1]  
Once a new government is in place in Baghdad, it is easy to foresee that United Nations Security 
Resolutions 1441, 688, 661, and 665 will eventually be lifted or modified, which will change the way naval 
operations are conducted in the Persian Gulf. The new security environment will require the Navy to 
reexamine its mission requirements and restructure its forces accordingly. Certainly a naval presence will 
be necessary to help provide security and stability during the regime change, and naval forces will still 
have a role within the region to help prosecute the war on terrorism. Other mission requirements will need 
to be defined, while attempting to address Arab sensitivities by reducing the military presence within the 
Gulf, and maintaining the ongoing efforts to fight the global war on terror. At this point, it is unclear 
whether and to what extent the Gulf states will want and/or need a continuous naval presence. 
Naval Presence Before the Gulf War 
The Navy has been operating in the Persian Gulf region since 1801 and has maintained a continuous 
presence there over the past 40 years. The pressing need for fuel for the fleet brought the ships of the 
U.S. Navy to the Persian Gulf in the post-World War II era and led to the establishment of a small, rotating 
force in the Middle East, under the command of the Commander in Chief, Northeastern and 
Mediterranean (CINCNELM). With the growth of the forces assigned to CINCNELM, the Middle East 
Force (MIDEASTFOR) was established in 1949. It provided the initial U.S. military response to any crisis 
in the region, as well as humanitarian and emergency assistance. Its peace-time mission focused on 
building relations within the Middle East, while providing a force large enough to deter aggressive Soviet 
Navy expansion in the theater. However, after the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the United States gradually 
assumed a greater responsibility for Gulf security. During the 1979-1981 Iranian hostage crisis, nearly 30 
Navy ships were on constant patrol in the region, including one carrier battle group in the Indian Ocean or 
North Arabian Sea. 
In 1980, the Carter Doctrine declared the Middle East to be a region of vital importance to U.S. strategic 
interests and thereby dedicated additional forces to the region. Throughout the 1980s and at the height of 
the Iran-Iraq war, MIDEASTFOR was composed of at least 12 ships, mine countermeasure teams, 
special warfare units, and the Navy's Administrative Support Unit in Bahrain.[2] This permanent force was 
periodically augmented by a carrier battle group. After the imposition of U.N. Security Resolutions in 1991 
at the end of the Gulf War, MIDEASTFOR became U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT), 
under the hierarchy of U.S. Central Command. By 1995, the course of events transpiring in the region 
required a renumbering of fleets, and after a 48-year hibernation, the United States 5th Fleet was 
reactivated. NAVCENT currently exercises command and control over all naval operations throughout 
their area of responsibility from its headquarters in Manama, Bahrain.[3]  
NAVCENT Today 
Since 1991, NAVCENT has enforced the sea-borne trade embargo on Iraq through Maritime Interception 
Operations in and around the Gulf to monitor and inspect vessels for illegal shipments of oil and weapons, 
and to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to and from Iraq in accordance with 
United Nations Resolutions. Over the past 12 years, conducting operations within the Persian Gulf has 
cost the United States billions of dollars. The cost of one carrier battle group operations and maintenance 
is estimated at $1 billion per year.[4] From 1999 to 2000, the costs of U.S. peace and security 
commitments in Southwest Asia and Iraq have totaled over $9 Billion.[5] More specifically, in 1997, 
Operation Desert Fox cost the United States $700 million to support 15,000 to 20,000 troops, 120 land-
based aircraft, and one carrier battle group in the CENTCOM AOR.[6]  
To support ongoing operations, the Navy has built eight primary forward-based facilities in the region, 
including its headquarters in Manama, Bahrain, and 15 logistics facilities in Yemen, Jordan, Djibouti, 
Qatar, UAE, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, and Kenya.[7] This infrastructure has provided 
the rotating battle groups in the region the ability to not only complete their missions and objectives, but 
also build security relations with the host countries. With the impending repeal of U.N. sanctions and the 
prospects of the type of future operations the navy will be conducting, a downsizing of presence levels is 
likely. Even though the number of assets deployed to the region will decrease, the U.S. Navy will maintain 
its forward headquarters and logistical bases in place in order to exploit their potential in fighting the war 
on terrorism and future threats to regional stability.  
The Future Role 
As tensions diffuse in the Middle East after Saddam's removal from power, the fact remains that the 
United States will still have strategic interests in the region that remain directly relevant to the Navy's 
mission. Maintaining its status as the "protector" of the world's oil supply is of critical concern to both the 
United States and the global economy. The Energy Information Administration projects that oil exports 
through the Strait of Hormuz will double from approximately 15 million barrels of oil today to 30-34 million 
barrels per day by 2020, suggesting that ensuring the free flow of oil through the Strait will continue to be 
an important mission.  
The post-Saddam Hussein Middle East will continue to be a region of great importance to the United 
States, and a region still facing threats to its security and stability. Iran continues to have the largest 
conventional military in the region and is continuing its active pursuit of nuclear capabilities. A robust 
United States Naval presence can act as the main deterrent to Iran, both in countering weapons 
proliferation and providing security to smaller Gulf states. As was witnessed months ago when the North 
Korean vessel carrying ballistic missiles was intercepted before it reached its Yemeni destination, the 
threat of missile and WMD proliferation will continue in the post-Saddam era not only from Iran, but the 
smaller Gulf states as well. The threat of these weapons coming into the hands of terrorist groups, such 
as Al Qaeda, will also continue for the foreseeable future. The war on terror is unlikely to end anytime 
soon and the potential for further fundamentalist threats in the region is great. The Navy could play a role 
in addressing all these threats. 
In order to respond to these future threats, the Navy will need to restructure its forces into more flexible, 
responsive, rapid action teams. A permanent naval force in the Gulf should consist of vessels from all 
Allied nations in the CENTCOM AOR. NATO's Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean or the recently 
formed Black Sea Force could serve as examples in developing the structure. This would aid in training 
various Gulf naval forces in maritime operations, would maintain goodwill with those nations, and over 
time this force could become less reliant on American assets to maintain security. Reverting back to a 
pre-Gulf War I surface contingent of a single flagship and five other surface combatants in joint operations 
with Allied forces might be a model that could well serve the security needs of the United States in the 
region. An occasional carrier battle group deployment could augment this force in case of a rising threat 
or contingency.  
The security environment within the Middle East promises to remain in a state of flux, and the United 
States Navy will have to adapt accordingly to those changes. The U.S. strategic goal of maintaining 
security and stability in the region while attempting to lessen its military presence will take time and 
cooperation from Allied and Gulf nations. The events that transpire in the aftermath of Saddam's removal 
from power and the responses from the surrounding nations will offer a tentative outline of what the future 
of the U.S. Navy will be in the Persian Gulf. 
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